"Russia-the story about the lonely sail"

“A lone white sail shows for an instant, 
Where gleams the sea, an azure streak. 
What left it in its homeland distant? 
In alien parts what does it seek?

The billow play, the mast bends creaking, 
The wind, impatient, moans and sighs... 
It is not joy that it is seeking, 
Nor is it happiness it flies.

The blue wave dance, they dance and tremble, 
The sun's bright ray caress the seas. 
And yet for storm it begs, the rebel, 
As if in storm lurked calm and peace!”

“Parus”(The sail) by Mihail Lermontov

One of the greatest Russian authors Mihail Lermontov once wrote the poem “Parus” (translated The Sail) which in my opinion epitomizes the Russian existential dilemmas and perceptions that have determined its fate for centuries. Just like the lonely sail at sea embarks on a never ending quest for a storm, as that is where it feels most comfortable, Russia has been following a collision course in history that can’t be fathomed easily using conventional methods and needs a much more thorough and deeper research in order to be rationalized.

Pondering for instance the recent presidential elections certainly should have been a simple matter-Vladimir Putin won by a predictably wide margin (64%).  Undoubtedly there were irregularities and intimidation by the ruling party, however even the independent observers believe that at least around 51% of the voters cast their ballots for Mr. Putin and this fact speaks by itself of the course that Russia has chosen to take-a path that started not with Putin or Yeltsin, not even with the communist leaders before them, but centuries ago when the Russian mentality was formed and when “the sail” embarked on its long journey in a treacherous and unpredictable world. That course has always been associated with the hope that a “good” tsar or a leader will somehow miraculously guide the ship through all the storms that lie ahead and supporting him automatically equals patriotism.

There are several factors that have contributed to the formation of the Russian culture, mentality and hence politics and (authoritarian) style of governance. The influence of the Byzantine Empire that started in the 10^th century with the adoption of Orthodox Christianity for example brought with itself a steady creation of a rule similar to the one in Constantinople. The title of the emperor was not initially hereditary-usually he or she was chosen based on leadership and also the support of the army. Only after establishing himself as a conqueror and warrior he could proclaim a ruling family line as the Comnenos and Angelos  in the Byzantine Empire and the Rurik and Romanov dynasties in Russia. Additionally once chosen the persona of the emperor became sacred-he was perceived to be the ultimate ruler whose decisions could not and would not be questioned as that would equal treason.

 If we draw a comparison with the current state of affairs in Russia one can’t help but notice that the president in Moscow has powers that are almost completely authoritarian-there is no system of checks and balances to counter his decisions-the ruling party has majority in the parliament and the head of state himself can appoint or dismiss the Prime Minister and its cabinet at whim. Additionally he gained popularity after winning the wars in Caucasus (Chechnya and Georgia) showing stamina and grit of a seasoned soldier and a commander in chief. What is even more curious is that given the way the free press is being intimidated and the general feeling among the population that there is no other alternative to Vladimir Putin, the pervasive notion is that having a “strong” leader is essential to the survival of the state as such.

Another factor that has played a significant role in forming the Russian perception of an existential need of a tough and determined leader is its geo-strategic weakness. Straddling the Euro-Asian land mass it has historically been prone to invasions from East or West as with the Mongols in the 13^th century, Napoleon in the 19^th century and Germany in the 20^th. Hence securing its eastern and western flanks has been an obsession that has naturally swayed its decisions to expand into Europe and Asia. However the moment it had felt it had accomplished that goal of fortifying its eastern and western borders as in the 19^th century for instance it had embarked on a brave thrust South seeking a warm sea port as its Baltic and North sea access points had somewhat limited capacity and the Black Sea could not suffice as it was blocked by the Dardanelles. Once it had reached the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, Russia considered Persia to be part of its natural sphere of influence-as a matter of fact it was ready to occupy it during and immediately after the Second World War. It only withdrew its interest there when it felt that its western flank was again threatened with the beginning of the Cold War.

What has occurred in the last 20 years can explain why Russia has renewed its latent interest in Iran (Persia). Strategically speaking its western and eastern flanks were secured again and ironically it happened without any effort from Moscow. The haphazard and somewhat disorganized admittance of Eastern and Central European states into the European Union and NATO created a puzzle that no one in the world could untangle. For instance some countries are members of both the EU and NATO, some only of EU but not NATO (Finland, Sweden and Austria), some of NATO but not the EU (Turkey). Additionally some are members of the Euro zone, some are not, some belong to the Shengen agreement some not (Bulgaria and Romania). The aftermath of that hodgepodge of overlapping alliances and sub groups is that Europe’s strategic position has weakened to the point that no one really knows who if anybody is making the decisions there. This weakness would explain the nonchalance with which Moscow accepted the latest expansion of NATO near its borders-the strategists in Kremlin perhaps saw it as an opportunity rather than a threat.

Additionally there are signs that there is a rapprochement in the making between Beijing and Moscow, based on common interests-both for instance have sizable Muslim minorities that they are trying to suppress and both have strategic and economic interests in South Asia, the Gulf and the Middle East. The steady thaw in the relations between Russia and China is the last piece of the puzzle to explain the latest and possibly future actions in world affairs-the recent joint veto they imposed in the UN Security Council with regards to Syria is just the beginning of the fledgling cooperation or “gentleman’s agreement” so to speak between the two authoritarian regimes. Incidentally that rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow also works in Kremlin’s favor as it secures its eastern flank and allows it to focus on being a significant player in Iran which it certainly sees as part of its strategic sphere of influence. It is not a coincidence that Russia has offered its expertise to build nuclear power plants in Iran-so far presumably for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless nuclear energy is just one way of exerting political and economic influence.

The rather ambitious strategic goals that dominate the Russian internal and foreign policy and the perception that only a strong leader can achieve them certainly explain the outcome of the recent presidential elections.  Just like in Lermontov’s poem the Russian people would much rather seek than run away from the upcoming storm placing their trust in the “good” tsar who will lead them bravely through it to safety. We can only hope that the “tsar” will in fact understand the enormous responsibility he has taken by accumulating so much power and do something for the people. If he doesn’t……..Russian history bears many an example of how unforgiving the masses could be to “bad” leaders.